namaste Nara and others.
Nara said in post #9:
So, the starting point of all Vedanta traditions is the premise that there is a Brhman, and this is asserted on the basis of Scripture only.
As indicated in my post #8, the logic in Vedanta admits all the six
pramANas:
pratyakSha, anumAna, upamAna, Agama/shabda/AptavAkya, arthApatti and anupalabdhi. The
shruti pramANa is that of revelation--
Agama/shabda/AptavAkya.
Here is an analysis of the
Agama pramANa, found in the book
Studies in Vedantism by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya. (downloadable at
Studies in Vedantism : Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra, 1875-1949 : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive . I have given the section numbers for ready reference).
87. Knowledge is of two kinds:
anubhava, readied through evidence (
pramANa), which may be both true (when it is
pramA] and false, but which is always something
new, previously unattained ; and
smRti or memory-knowledge which, however, is not something new.
112.
vAkya, a sentence or series of sentences in which there is a principal one to which the others are subordinate, is said to be a
pramANa or independent source of knowledge.
• When we say, a word
means a thing, we do not mean that the word reminds us of the idea of a thing. We may no doubt consciously pause to remember or visualise the ideas, but this remembering is not understanding the meaning of the word, any more than
any irrelevant idea, of which we are reminded by a word, is a part of the meaning.
• The word directly refers to the thing, expresses the thing, touches it (
bRhadAraNyaka upaniShad 1.5.3) in a sense.
• With the same naivete with which we objectify our ideas in perception, we objectify the word. The free concept not only requires the name for its support but is identical with it, though transcending it.
• Just as the presentative and representative elements of perception are not only associated but identified, being covered by the same determination of the self and objectified by it, so too in conception, the same determination of the self gives the name and the concept an identical object-reference. This unity of the name and the concept works unconsciously even in perception.
113. The sentence at once refers to an objective relation. The moment it is employed (provided of course it is a complete sentence, satisfying certain conditions, to be explained presently) a belief is generated in something objective. So Mill argued against the conceptualistic theory of judgment that 'the sun is hot' does not mean that the idea of the sun is the idea of hot.
• The copula of a judgment is the self pointing necessarily to an object and the unity of the sentence is but this self clothed in language.
• The primordial objective reference of a judgment is a provisional belief, a belief, it may be, with a certain general cautiousness induced by experience; if it is only
thought, it is at any rate
continuous with knowledge. The mere absence of conflict with other evidence is sufficient to turn it into knowledge: we do not require a positive confirmation by other evidence.
114. The understanding or the self in judgments transcends judgments and points to the Ideas of the Reason or noumena. They are to be realised only in ecstatic intuition, but till that is forthcoming, the necessary thought of them must have some intuition-basis, viz., a name.
• Each noumenon demands its true expression, and as Schopenhauer remarked, a potent musical sound constitutes its direct objectification whereas other aesthetic symbols are mere imitations of its grosser objectifications.
• Such potent sound-symbols are supplied by the
mantras, by such mystic syllables as the
Om, the power of which is not to be judged by any a
priori reasoning but only through the persistent attempt to realise them by devout intonation.
• A conventional word comes to mean a thing, to be provisionally identified with a thing, only through this necessary demand of the thing for its true sound-symbol.
115. The same result is reached in another way. Though every
vAkya,as having a direct objective intention, has the appearance of impersonality, yet as it may be ambiguous or false and may have reference to phenomenal truth, a subjective personal element has also to be taken into account.
• It is only in true statements about the supersensuous that this personal element is wholly eliminated. The supersensuous, as has been already explained (Section 84), to be thought at all, must have been revealed.
• The Vedas claim to be the repository of all such true statements about the supersensuous; and whether the claim is allowed or not, the true revelation, wherever it is found, must have also the true form, and therefore the perfection or the sacredness of it must transfigure every sound (or letter) composing it.
117. Vedanta, however, holds that the system of sounds is not created but only manifested. When a letter is articulated it is not created but only manifested in sensuous form (
dhvani).
• Whenever a sound is produced, we recognise it as 'that sound'. If we are to believe in this recognition, every distinctive sound-form must be taken to have a persistence, not as air-vibration, but as sound-form (in its immediacy, as sensuous objectivity).
• The manifestation alone is in time but the sound-form is eternal. Thus the eternity of 'names' (
nAma-rUpa) and the impersonal reality of the Word are intelligible.
• The question of the
primum cognitum naturally leads to the theory of the eternal pre-existence of all differences that come to be manifested (Section 42). The Word which is thus manifested to us is to be regarded as the Word existent in all previous cycles, now freely remembered and manifested by Ishvara. So VirAj at birth remembered he was Brahman ('aham BrahmAsmi' BR.up.}.
• To Ishvara, who is eternally free in intelligence and volition, all these remembrances before each creation (
sRShTi) are one, and all these
sRShTis are but the timeless actualisation of the same Vedas or objective Reason. To the individual, however, the manifestation in a particular cycle is new.
118. The Word is co-eternal with Ishvara, both being Infinite determinations of Brahman, and it is noticeable that the same word
shakti or power is used to indicate both the relation of Ishvara to created (manifested) things and the relation of the Word (and therefore any word) to its objective meaning. In both cases, this
shakti, though but
mAyA investing Brahman (Section 52), is turned into an impersonal reality by the irradiation of Brahman.
119. The meaning of a word is two-fold, direct (
shakya) and implied (
lakShya). The object which is directly meant is that towards which the word functions through its
shakti.
• A word refers to a thing through its
jAti or class. The reference to the individual is not independent of the reference to the universal (substance and attribute being taken to be identical in Vedanta), except in cases where the name directly points to the thing.
• The
shakti is there said to be
svarUpa-shakti (non-connotative reference) but not
jnAta-hetu, i.e., not functioning through reason, i.e., not applying to the individual because of its possessing certain attributes.
• No doubt the direct reference of a word to (or its identity with) the universal also is unaccountable, but it is still
jnAta-hetu, i.e.; self-conscious reference and not a mere pointing out with the finger.
• Although essence and an existent partaking of the essence (
visheShaNa and visheShya) are not different in reality, they are absolutely distinct aspects to the judging or discursive reason.
120. The reference to the individual through the universal is to be taken as only an implied reference or
lakShaNA.
• This
lakShaNA is not the function of a single word but of the whole sentence. The sentence reacts on each word that it contains.
• How is that possible? How do
shakya and lakShya blend? Just as in perception, the concept unconsciously synthesises the intuition, so in a judgment the copular unity modifies each of the terms. 'A is B' is really equivalent to 'AB is AB'.
• The sentence is an organic unity and each word in it partakes of the common life. The judgment has a tendency to lapse into a concept. This is noticeable in eulogistic or abusive sentences which are not meant to be literally taken but express simply praise or abuse. Ultimately the sentence unity is only for the knowledge of particular objects, and the members of this unity, the concepts, also refer to them.
121. Not every combination of words, however, constitutes a true sentence, but only such as has the conditions of
AkAmkShA, yogyatA, Asatti, and tAtparya.
• These might be roughly translated as 'syntactical connexion' (the mutual demand of the essential parts of a sentence for one another, as the demand of a verb for its subject, of a transitive verb for its object, etc.),
‣ 'compatibility of meaning' (of parts of the sentence),
‣ 'proximity of the parts,' and
‣ the 'objective intention.'
• The abstract assertive form of a sentence is determined by
AkAmkShA, as the self thinks of object through the categories, though sometimes the assertive form appears almost in its purity as in the appositional construction (
abhedAnvaya) 'this pot is a blue pot,' where there is no
AkAmkShA ('syntactical connexion' therefore is too wide a rendering).
‣ This assertive form, determinate or otherwise, may be perfect, though there may not be compatibility of meaning, as in 'this square is round.' This compatibility of meaning is what is ordinarily called consistency, though it has a material aspect, too, for in one sense even a self-contradictory sentence is conceivable through the prepositional form.
•
Asatti or the proximity of the parts has reference to the articulatory or written form of a sentence rather than to the thought-unity, though this form is but the expression of the unity.
‣ It is that which makes us understand omitted words in elliptical constructions and unites the direct meaning of the words of a sentence with their implied meaning.
•
tAtparya is the capacity of a sentence to produce objective knowledge. It is not the subjective intention of the person uttering the sentence, though in cases of ambiguity the subjective intention has to be taken into account.
‣ It is the objective intention, which, in cases of ambiguity or the like, is not contradicted by the subjective intention.
‣ So a true sentence, even when uttered by one not understanding or misunderstanding it, has an intrinsic
tAtparya.
• If
yogyatA be the formal compatibility of meaning,
tAtparya is compatibility in a material reference, the unity of the sentence and the corresponding objective relation. There might be higher unities, too, but these go beyond the sentence form.
122. The first thought roused by a sentence may be one of doubt or misunderstanding; should it then be said that the objective knowledge produced by a sentence is dependent on a prior belief induced by other evidences?
• No, says Vedanta; a sentence by itself has the objective reference. The knowledge of the objective relations through other
pramANas may no doubt remove doubts and misunderstanding, but is not necessarily demanded by the sentence.
• The sentence shines by its own light. The ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence, however, may be aided by the knowledge of the topic through other evidences, as in the case of sentences having secular reference.
• In the case of revealed texts, however, the meaning is evolved through
mImAMsA of the texts themselves, i.e., through their mutual criticism and not through any extraneous
pramANa; for no other
pramANa can determine of the super-sensible.
**********
, without even attempting to address the main question I posed. It would be easier for me to understand your view if you would present it in a summarized manner, with only links to source materials. It is laborious if all that is presented is just a long list of source materials. Hope you would oblige.
